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Abstract
This study seeks to advance and test the knowledge-based theory of the firm
as it applies to explaining the governance structure of R&D alliances. Unlike
transaction-cost economics, the knowledge-based theory attempts to explain or-
ganizational form not primarily in terms of incentive misalignment but in terms of
the creation, acquisition, and coordination of productive capabilities. To study the
role played by firm-specific technological competencies, I consider three techno-
logical characteristics of an alliance technological similarity, technological relat-
edness, and technological diversity. With a sample of 111 biotech-biotech R&D
alliances, I find that technological relatedness and diversity increase the proba-
bility that allying firms would select the higher integration mode. Technological
similarity, though, bears a non-monotonic relationship with organizational choice.
Overall, the results support the knowledge-based argument that the idiosyncrasy
in technological traits influences which type of alliance forms would be selected
by allying firms.
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1. Introduction 
Since the 1970s, R&D alliances have become an important way through which 
firms acquire, develop and create new technologies.  Many literatures discuss why 
alliances appear so frequently and what their effects are (Shan et al. 1994; Chan et al. 
1997; Powell et al. 1996; Zucker et al. 1998; Niosi 2003).  Less has been asked about 
what influences the firm’s choice of alliance forms.  Alliances take on numerous forms, 
ranging from licensing contracts to collaborations to joint ventures to mergers and 
acquisitions.  A discussion on the determinants of the choice among alliances forms 
would deepen the understanding of the boundary of the firm.  Specifically, the 
proliferation of lateral relationship in high-technology industries, such as 
pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and semiconductors, provides a unique opportunity to 
examine the arguments in the knowledge-based theory of the firm. 
This study seeks to advance and test the knowledge-based theory of the firm as it 
applies to explaining the governance structure of R&D alliances.  In particular, it 
investigates organizational choices by US public biotechnology firms among three types 
of alliances: R&D agreements, R&D collaborations and minority equity R&D alliances1.  
It employs three measures to describe the technological characteristics of an alliance: 
technological similarity, technological relatedness, and technological diversity.  The 
results suggest that the idiosyncrasy in technological traits influence what type of alliance 
forms would be selected by allying firms. 
                                                 
1  As defined by ReCap: in a research agreement, a sponsoring party engages another party to perform 
R&D services in the discovery and/or lead stages of an R&D project; in a development agreement a 
sponsoring party engages another party to perform R&D services beyond the stage of lead generation; in a 
collaboration agreement, two or more parties perform research and/or development activities in a single 
R&D program.; an equity agreement describes the issuance of a minority share (<50%) of legal ownership 
interest in an entity.  I define minority equity R&D alliance as research agreements, development 
agreements or collaborations that involve an equity agreement.   
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On the question of how technological similarity affects the firm’s ability to integrate 
knowledge, two lines of thought in the knowledge-based perspective predict two distinct 
relations.  The study argues that the difference arises only because researchers analyze 
two different aspects of the firm’s knowledge-related activities: managing and learning.  
The results provide supportive evidences for both streams of thought.  Allying firms with 
more divergent technologies are more likely to select a more highly integrated alliance 
form.  At higher levels of technological similarity, however, the relationship between 
technological similarity and organizational choice reverse the direction: a higher degree 
of technological similarity leads to a higher integration mode in alliances.  It suggests 
dynamic changes in the gains and costs in learning and managing.  The gains for learning 
within the boundary of the firm exceed the managing costs when technologies are highly 
dissimilar, suggesting the firm would integrate divergent technologies.  The gains 
diminish as similarity in technologies increase.  When technologies are highly similar, 
managing costs, which are lower for more homogenous technological portfolio, became a 
greater influence on the firm’s decision on the organizational choice. 
In measuring technological relatedness, it adopts the survivor measure originally 
designed by Teece et al. (1994).  The results show that closely complementary 
technological capabilities increase the probability that allying firms would select the 
higher integration mode, that is, minority equity R&D alliances over R&D collaborations, 
or R&D collaborations over R&D agreements, although the length of establishment may 
reduce this influence. 
Firms also differ with respects to technological diversity.  Diversity of current 
technological stock influences firms’ future technology-related decisions.  For a given 
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level of technological similarity, a technological generalist may be more willing and able 
to bring technologies in-house than a technological specialist.  The empirical test shows 
that the technological diversity of the client firm2 is positively related to the probability 
of selecting a high integration mode, with technological similarity controlled. 
In the paragraphs follow, I first review the literature on the knowledge-based theory 
of the firm and its application to the organizational choice of R&D alliances.  Then I 
develop the theory on the basis of the knowledge-based theory and present the 
hypotheses to be tested on how technological characteristics influence organizational 
choices.  Description of the U.S. biotechnology industry, the sample used, measures and 
statistical models follows.  I present the empirical results by comparing three models:  
“transaction costs perspective”, “traditional knowledge-based approach”, and “complete 
knowledge-based approach”, respectively.  A discussion on the findings concludes. 
 
2. The knowledge-based theory of the firm, technological capabilities and R&D 
alliances 
The idea of looking at firms in terms of their resource endowments goes back to 
the seminal work of Penrose (1959), who defines a firm as “a pool of resources the 
utilization of which is organized in an administrative framework.”  Wernerfelt (1984) 
includes machine capacity, customer loyalty, production experience, and technological 
leads as examples for attractive resources of firms.  Many researches following Penrose’s 
definition focus on technological knowledge endowed in the firm.  The endowment of 
knowledge, also called capabilities or competence by various writers, is different among 
                                                 
2 As defined in ReCap: an R&D firm is “the party in the alliance associated with the technology’s research 
and development.”  An client firm is “the party in the alliance that is gaining access to a technology 
developed by the R&D partner.” 
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firms and consequently influences the firm’s behavior and performance.  Part of this 
resource is “knowing that”, but much of it is “knowing how”, which is not reducible to 
mere information to be passed on but consists also of experience and skills.  A resource-
based perspective of the firm thus entails a knowledge-based theory of the firm. 
In the knowledge-based theory, firms are viewed as bundles of technological 
capabilities.  This theory brings a new perspective in answering “why does the firm 
exist?”  Since Coase (1937), researchers have believed that a firm exists as an “incentive 
coordination” mechanism solving the problem of how the members of a firm can be 
rewarded and induced to work efficiently (Alchian and Demsetz 1972).  Unlike previous 
theories of the firm, the knowledge-based theory always looks to “qualitative 
coordination”3 as the mechanism that aligns the creation, acquisition, and coordination of 
technological knowledge of the various players (Langlois 1997). 
From inter-firm R&D alliances, firms can get access to new technologies, realize 
economies of scale and scope in their R&D activities, and shorten development time.  
These benefits may spread out beyond the life of the alliance, as firms learn skills and 
gain competencies form their partners.  Yet, to benefit from R&D alliances, firms must 
create an organizational structure that supports the efficient recognition, assimilation, and 
application of knowledge-based assets. 
Coase’s 1937 paper on “The Nature of the Firm” suggests that organizational choice 
is decided by a cost comparison between the market and the firm.  In the ensuing 
                                                 
3 “The firm is an institution that lowers the costs of qualitative coordination in a world of uncertainty, 
where by coordination I mean the process of aligning the knowledge and expectations of the parties who 
need to cooperate in production, and by qualitative coordination I mean coordination involving the 
transmission of information beyond price and quantity.” (Langlois 1997, p. 6) 
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literatures, different understandings of the sources of costs led to different explanations of 
why firms exist. 
In transaction-cost economics, opportunism has long been in the main concern.  And 
hierarchy is the weapon of choice against transaction costs brought on by opportunistic 
behavior.  Pisano (1990, 1991) studies the make-or-buy decision of R&D alliances in 
biotechnology industry using this approach.   I argue that transaction costs economics’ 
emphasis on incentive alignment and its unwillingness to analyze knowledge 
coordination makes it inappropriate for the question of R&D alliances, whose main 
objective is to acquire and create new technologies.  Moreover, it is hard to relate the 
characteristics of knowledge assets with the probability of opportunistic behavior.  Some 
argue that the probability of opportunistic behavior is low when knowledge is highly 
similar because there is no new knowledge for leakage (Sampson 2004).  This is not 
necessarily true. 
Unlike transaction costs economics, the knowledge-based theory of the firm 
attempts to explain organizational form not primarily in terms of opportunism or 
incentive misalignment but in terms of the creation, acquisition, and coordination of 
productive knowledge or capabilities.  It assumes that opportunism is unrelated to the 
characteristics of the technological assets. 
Two papers in the current literature apply the knowledge-based theory to explaining 
the organization form of alliances.  Sampson (2004) uses a sample of 237 alliances 
during 1991-1993 in the telecommunication equipment industry to test hypotheses 
derived from transaction-cost economics and knowledge-based theory.  Her result is in 
favor of transaction-cost economics.  Colombo (2003) studies alliances among the world 
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largest IT companies. His results show that both theories can explain part of the 
organizational arrangement.  When discussing the knowledge-based theory, these two 
studies restrict their attention in investigating only how learning influences organizational 
choice and similarity is the only technological characteristic included in their model. 
In the model, I suggest that technological similarity has different effects in the two 
technology-related activities within an alliance: managing and learning (Penrose 1959; 
Richardson 1972; Loasby 1998; Conner and Phrahalad 1996).  The previous literature 
suggests that other technological characteristics apart from similarity also influence the 
firm’s behavior.  I consider technological relatedness (Hagedoorn and Duysters 2002) 
and technological diversity (Stuart 1995) in the model. 
 
3. Technological characteristics and organizational choice: theory and hypotheses 
Unanimously, the knowledge-based theory views the firm as a bundle of 
technological capabilities and sees the firm as qualitative coordination mechanism that 
aligns the creation, acquisition, and coordination of knowledge of the partners.  On the 
question of firms’ ability to integrate knowledge, however, this theory would seem to be 
of two minds.  One strand of thought holds that firms are limited in integrating and using 
knowledge very different from what they already possess; the other strand suggests that 
firms have advantages over markets precisely when knowledge is most different from the 
existing base. 
The first line of thought, arguing that the firm is better at integrating similar 
knowledge than dissimilar knowledge, goes back to Penrose (1959)’s The Theory of the 
Growth of the Firm, where she provided us with excellent accounts of how firms grow in 
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directions set by their capabilities and how these capabilities themselves slowly expand 
and alter.  Richardson, in his 1972 paper “The Organization of Industry”, expands this 
idea and points out that the firm would find it expedient to concentrate on activities 
requiring similar capabilities.  Coordination of dissimilar knowledge has to be brought 
about either through inter-firm ex ante cooperation, or through the process of adjustment 
by the market mechanism.  Loasby (1998)’s “The Organization of Capabilities” is of 
special importance as it explicitly distinguishes indirect capabilities from direct 
capabilities.  Direct capabilities involve knowing how to do certain things by the firm 
itself, whereas indirect capabilities involve knowing how to get things done for the firm 
by others.  Penrose, Richardson, and Loasby’s discussion focuses on indirect capabilities.  
Indirect capabilities are of two kinds: the firm may be able to get things done for itself 
either by gaining controls of others’ capabilities through hierarchies or by obtaining 
access to them across markets.  A cost comparison between control and access decides 
the choice between firms and markets.  Loasby (1998, p. 152) believes that “it is not even 
sensible to extend a firm into areas of activity that require capabilities which are 
significantly different from those already developed.” 
Conner and Prahalad develop the other view in their 1996 paper, “A Resource-based 
Theory of the Firm: Knowledge Versus Opportunism.”  Its theme is that the 
organizational mode through which individual firms cooperate affects the knowledge 
they apply to business activities.  They argue that a firm is superior to a market in 
learning dissimilar knowledge.  Thus, when the firm needs to learn dissimilar knowledge, 
it should do so through integration. 
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Both lines of thought view the firm as a bundle of capabilities or technological 
knowledge.  Also, both aim at developing an empirically relevant and complementary 
theory based on irreducible knowledge differences between individual firms rather than 
on the threat of purposeful cheating or withholding of information.   It is the great 
similarity between them that makes their contradictory conclusions even more 
interesting. 
The difference arises only because these writers analyze two different aspects of the 
firm’s knowledge related activities: managing and learning.  Penrose, Richardson and 
Loasby elucidate how the firm gets things done for itself by either gaining control of or 
obtaining access to other’s knowledge.  They believe that firms have a higher managerial 
cost when technologies are dissimilar.  Conner and Prahalad, however, emphasize that 
the firm passes its capabilities onto others by either directing others within the boundary 
of the firm or having its own capabilities internalized by others in the market.  They 
believe that firms are more efficient in learning dissimilar knowledge than markets.  The 
former group of researchers compares those two kinds of indirect capabilities to choose 
between control and access, while the latter studies whether gains in direct capabilities, 
that is, do-it-by-yourself abilities, can better be obtained within an organization like the 
firm or through the market. 
Inter-firm cooperation is concerned very often with the transfer, exchange and 
pooling of knowledge between cooperating firms.  Thus, managing the other’s 
knowledge and passing on one’s own knowledge (or learning the other’s knowledge) are 
two different activities dwelling in the same process.  In order to see the whole picture, a 
valid conceptual framework needs to consider them simultaneously. 
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3.1. Managing technology  
Penrose (1959) points out that hierarchical administration is itself a capability 
with limits, which implies that including too diversified knowledge within the boundary 
of the firm would result in diseconomies of scale in the management resources of the 
firm, something originally alluded to by Coase (1937, p. 394) under “decreasing returns 
to the entrepreneur function.”  In Richardson’s (1972) opinion, organizations would tend 
to specialize in activities where their capabilities offer some comparative advantage.  He 
believes that these activities will generally be similar in the sense of requiring similar 
knowledge.  Thus, managing technology suggests: 
Hypothesis 1a: With all else equal, in technological alliances greater similarity in 
allying firms’ technological portfolios will result in a higher propensity for high 
integration modes. 
This line of thought also suggests that technological relatedness influences the 
decision on the choice between firms and markets.  Loasby (1998) believes that control 
has substantial advantages but it is likely to be more costly than access.  Firms can access 
more than they can control. Therefore, they should limit their attempts at control to those 
capabilities which are both “crucial and manageable” Loasby (1998, p. 149).  By “crucial 
and manageable” capabilities, he means a range of related skills.  He believes knowledge 
development must be guided in a compatible direction and in appropriate ways. 
It is therefore clearly not sensible to attempt to manage an economy as 
one enormous firm; it is not even sensible to extend a firm into areas of 
activity that require capabilities which are significantly different from 
those already developed, and so it is not surprising that firms so often 
develop a product portfolio which depends on a range of related skills. 
(Loasby 1998, p. 152) 
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Another reason that firms would retain closely related technologies within its 
boundary is related to the dynamic transaction costs in the market.  Langlois (1992, p. 99) 
defines dynamic transaction costs as “the costs of persuading, negotiating, coordinating, 
and teaching outside suppliers” or as “the costs of not having the capabilities you need 
when you need them.”  Such costs increase with technological relatedness between firms, 
because closely related or closely complementary technologies are usually necessary for 
firms’ production and development.  The more related the technologies are, the higher the 
probability that the firm will need it frequently; thus it would be more costly to leave the 
access to the technologies in the market. 
In a word, the firm should retain within its boundary only a set of “related” 
technologies requiring more or less the same kind of knowledge in order to minimize 
managerial costs and dynamic transaction costs. 
Hypothesis 2: With all else equal, in technological alliances the greater 
relatedness in allying firms’ technological specialization will result in a higher propensity 
for high integration modes. 
3.2. Learning technology 
Learning technology suggests a different relationship between technological 
similarity and organizational choice from that suggested by the analysis of managing 
costs.  On the one hand, since the firm is familiar with the knowledge that is similar to its 
own base, if it wants to acquire more knowledge in this line, market contracting is 
relatively cheaper, because there is less asymmetric information about knowledge 
compared with the situation in which the firm has to learn highly different knowledge.  
Meanwhile, it is usually costly to compromise between two firms’ managerial styles even 
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when they manage identical knowledge bases.  On the other hand, as Conner and 
Phrahalad (1996) assert, the firm is relatively more efficient than the market in learning 
highly different knowledge, even after considering management frictions. 
Conner and Prahalad (1996) argue that the organizational mode through which 
individuals cooperate affects the knowledge they apply to business activity.  The 
difference in the knowledge that is brought to bear under the two organizational modes 
would impact the choice of mode itself.  They mainly consider two effects that 
organizational modes have on knowledge transfer: “knowledge substitution effect” and 
“flexibility effect.” 
The knowledge substitution effect is about how the parties’ starting knowledge 
endowments are blended and used.  The ability of a firm to learn the partner firm’s 
knowledge in the market varies with the degree of difference in their knowledge bases.  
The more similar the target knowledge is to the firm’s own knowledge base, the easier it 
is to acquire the partner’s knowledge.  Alternatively, the more dissimilar the target 
knowledge is, the more difficult (i.e. the higher the cost) for the firm to master it through 
the market. 
Conner and Phrahalad (1996) emphasize that different economic organizations 
facilitate knowledge transfer differently because of different ways in economizing on 
bounded rationality.  Market contracts solve bounded rationality by specialization only, 
while firms economize on cognitive limitations through both specialization and 
knowledge-substitution or what Langlois (1997, p. 6) calls “qualitative coordination.”  In 
their argument, a firm has to understand and accept the other firm’s knowledge before it 
takes any action in accordance with the other’s knowledge in the market.  However, 
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within the boundary of a firm, employees can be directed on the basis of the employer’s 
knowledge without internalizing it first. 
The initial knowledge status of cooperating parties affects the benefits brought by 
knowledge substitution in different organization modes.  Conner and Prahalad (1996) 
suggest that expected difficulties in knowledge absorption cause cooperating parties to 
favor a firm, because the organizational integration would allow one firm’s knowledge 
dominate the other’s.  It implies that the greater is the initial difference in the knowledge 
between two organizations, the more likely is a firm to be used in the cooperation. 
Conner and Prahalad (1996) define flexibility as the ability of the organization to 
apply and develop knowledge.  I agree with them that different economic organizations 
have different flexibility.  However, I give different explanations for the difference.  In 
Conner and Prahalad’s view, flexibility is mainly a problem of market uncertainty.  If 
market conditions are expected to be highly uncertain, they conclude, a market contract 
has higher costs in flexibility since many follow-up renegotiations will be necessary 
because of changes in the future.  The costs are low within the firm because it is easier to 
change directions in the firm in response to both internal and external changes. 
Their conclusion depends on the assumption that it is desirable for cooperation 
between the two firms to continue.  However, this may not be true all the time.  In fact, as 
market conditions changes, cooperation between the two firms may turn out to be 
infeasible, and it becomes better for both parties to terminate the cooperation or to change 
partners.  In this case, a market contract is more flexible because its cost to change the 
cooperative relationship is low.  The firm, in contrast, has higher costs to terminate 
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cooperation.  I consider it inappropriate to assert that the firm is more flexible in an 
uncertain world based only on considering the problem of renegotiation. 
Loasby (Foss 1997, p. 12) draws the analogy of an economic organization as a 
reservoir, that is, a pool of resources (capabilities).  Different capabilities have different 
present and future values to the organization: some are currently useful while some are 
idle but may be useful in the future.  Firms require both because nobody can predict 
exactly what is going to happen in the future.  The analogy tells us that the firm can store 
knowledge whose potential uses they do not immediately know.  It is common to obtain 
and reserve some idle technologies in the evolutionary process of the firm (such as side 
products from research and development activities) which are of “no use” at present.  If 
the same research and development is carried out in the market, those technologies may 
be ignored and lost because there are immediate costs to incorporate or store the 
knowledge but no immediate benefits in sight.  Basically, it is a “no rider” problem.  
However, the “idle” knowledge may be important for future development and 
competition.  The costs are much lower for the firm to reserve “idle” technologies after 
they have already come in existence.  In this sense, the firm is more flexible than the 
market in incorporating the unexpected technology output from R&D activities.  Also, 
the firm as a reservoir is better at maintaining continuity in knowledge application and 
development. 
Uncertainty is an inherent characteristic of R&D activities.  The similarity 
between the knowledge bases of two cooperating R&D partners is an important factor 
that affects the degree of uncertainty.  The less similarity between the two partners there 
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is at the beginning, the more difficult it is for them to predict the process of cooperating 
in R&D, and the higher will be the uncertainty in R&D results.   
Therefore, a firm is superior to a market in learning dissimilar knowledge because 
of substitution and flexibility effects.  The market organization is better for learning when 
the partners have similar knowledge, since the costs for writing and carrying out the 
contract are relatively low.  In this case, integration generates little knowledge gain, while 
incurring significant set-up cost.  By contrast, when the target knowledge is quite 
different, it is difficult to learn through contracting because of both unfamiliarity and 
uncertainty.  Thus, it is better to integrate with the organization owning that knowledge 
when the firm learns some knowledge quite dissimilar to what it already knows.  
Considering knowledge substitution and flexibility, learning technology suggests: 
Hypothesis 1b: With all else equal, in technological alliances greater divergence 
in allying firms’ technological specialization will result in a higher propensity for high 
integration modes. 
This argument is consistent with Cohen and Levinthal (1990)’s discussion of 
“absorptive capacity.”  They suggest that the ability to evaluate and utilize outside 
knowledge is largely a function of the richness of the preexisting knowledge structure of 
the firm.  They point out that “learning is cumulative, and learning performance is 
greatest when the object of learning is related to what is already known.” (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990, p. 131)  It also implies, when knowledge is dissimilar, integration is 
preferred in order to compensate for the lack of absorptive capacity in the market. 
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3.3. Technological diversity 
Technological diversity has an effect on both learning and managing technology.  
In terms of learning, technology diversity influences gains through knowledge 
substitution and flexibility.  Research in the area of cognitive and behavioral sciences 
suggests that diversity enhances a firm’ learning and innovation abilities in two ways: 
experiences in learning dissimilar knowledge and novel associations with and linkage to 
existing knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990).  Thus, a more diversified firm 
accumulates more experiences in learning.  In terms of managing technology, managing 
costs are different for a technological generalist and a technological specialist in 
integrating same knowledge.  I argue that generalists have lower costs in learning and 
managing dissimilar technologies because of accumulated experiences. 
Hypothesis 3: With all else equal, in technological alliances the greater diversity 
in allying firms’ technological portfolios will result in a higher propensity for high 
integration modes, technological similarity constant. 
 
4. The U.S. biotechnology industry 
According to the Department of Commerce (DOC) 2003 survey, biotechnology is 
defined as the application of molecular and cellular processes to solve problems, conduct 
research, and create goods and services.  Biotechnology emerged as an industry in the 
late 1970s and it has been in rapid development since then, especially from the mid-
1980s.  R&D activities are the most prominent driver of the growth.  The R&D intensity 
of biotech business lines was 33.4% in 2001, compared with 9.5% for the firms’ entire 
businesses and 4.3% for total U.S. corporate R&D spending.  Furthermore, the firms’ 
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near-term business strategies are still focused primarily on R&D activities.  In the 2003 
survey, 53% of the respondents say their business strategy is to develop technologies that 
can be licensed to others and 47% are seeking opportunity to acquire technologies from 
other companies through licensing arrangements.  Active research and development 
makes biotechnology a good candidate to study and test the knowledge-based theory of 
the firm. 
There are seven areas for biotechnology application according to the Department 
of Commerce4 .  Some researchers (e.g. Powell et al. 1996) concentrate on human health 
service because of different incentives and regulations between human health activities 
and agriculture or environmental remediation.  Many researchers (e.g. Barley et al. 1992) 
treat the wide array of biotechnology companies as comparable.  I follow this approach 
and include R&D alliances between all for-profit public biotechnology firms established 
after 1976 in the sample. 
In the current U.S. statistical system, biotechnology is not an independent 
industry.  It is not feasible to choose firms according to SIC or NAICS categories.  For 
the alliance data, I simply rely on ReCap data’s categorization of firms (See below).  For 
the biotechnology industry sample in calculating technological relatedness matrix, I rely 
on the collection of public companies listed on NYSE and NASDAQ (See below). 
 
5. Data and method 
To study the relationship between technological characteristics and organizational 
choice, I use alliance and firm data in the biotechnology industry and U.S. patent data for 
                                                 
4 The seven areas include (DOC 2003, p. 10) human health, animal health, agriculture and aquacultural / 
marine, marine & terrestrial microbial, industrial & agricultural-derived processing, environmental 
remediation & natural resource recovery and others.   
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the knowledge base of the firms.  The main source of alliance data is from ReCap, which 
contains high-level summaries of more than 13,500 alliances in the life sciences which 
have been formed since 1973.  I employ publicly listed NYSE and NASDAQ 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms in the calculation of the survivor measure of 
technological relatedness. 
5.1. Alliances data 
I study biotech-biotech alliances during 1998-2000 in the U.S.  There are three 
restrictions on biotech firms in the sample: (1) Only U.S. firms are included.  This is 
because I use U.S. patents to build the firm’s knowledge base.  Including only U.S. firms 
avoids the bias brought by the patent application intention.  Also, R&D alliances 
involving foreign companies may have different incentives from those domestic alliances 
(Sampson 2004).  (2) Only firms incorporated after 1976 are included.  By this time 
constraint, I concentrate on newly established biotechnology firms.  America’s first firm 
to exploit rDNA, Genentech, was established in 1976.  Old firms, such as big 
pharmaceutical firms, are also doing research and development in biotechnology.  
However, both their knowledge bases and their characteristics are quite different from 
those of new biotechnology firms.  (3) Only public firms are included.  This constraint 
arises from data availability.  I need to build a profile for each firm in the sample, such as 
incorporation year, the number of employees, the family tree, and R&D expenses.  Such 
information is difficult to obtain for private firms.   
I collect a sample of 111 alliances during 1998-2000 between U.S. public biotech 
firms established in or after 1976.  Among various alliances forms, I study the following 
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three types:  R&D agreements, R&D collaborations and minority equity R&D alliances.  
Table 1 shows a summary of the sample. 
[Table 1 here] 
I create profiles for each firm and identify their family trees by the following 
sources: (1) Mergent Industrial Manual, Mergent OTC Industrial Manual and Mergent 
OTC Unlisted Manual (2001-1999); (2) LexisNexis/company profile and SEC filing 
(online database at University of Connecticut Libraries); (3) ReCap data base (June 2004-
June 2005). 
5.2. Patents as an indicator for technological capabilities 
Different indicators have been applied in studying technological activities of 
firms.  The ideal way would be to obtain the firm’s R&D expenditure and split it into 
different technological sectors.  However, R&D information is rarely available at the firm 
level, not to mention at the activity level.  Some researchers use survey data, which is 
hard to generalize.  These weaknesses of R&D and survey data explain the relative 
success of patents as an indicator of firms’ innovation activities.  The United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) keeps records of patents it assigned since 1790.  
More important, USPTO provides consistent technology classification for each patent it 
assigned.  The completeness, continuousness, and consistency of the patent data provide 
us a good indicator for the firm’s technology capabilities. 
I use Delphion to collect patent data, including the patent number, the granted 
date, the filed date and the current U.S. classification for each patent.  There are two 
classifications for US patents: US classification and International Patent Classification.  I 
use US classification in the study because it emphasizes the technological aspect of 
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patents.  The patent portfolio of a firm includes all patents assigned to itself and to all its 
subsidiaries in a sample year. 
There are some potential problems in using patents, though.  Technologies from 
different disciplines may be closely integrated.  And arbitrariness cannot be avoided in 
the division between certain patent classes (Cantwell 2004).  Even without the problems 
with patents classifications, it is necessary to recognize that patents have limited use 
outside high-tech industries.  Moreover, the codified knowledge embodies in patents 
usually cannot be readily translated into production and commercialization. 
Cantwell (2004) have tried to alleviate the difficulties in directly using the patent 
classification system by devising a classification scheme that groups together patent 
classes that are the most technological related.  Each patent in the data has been classified 
according to this scheme.  Some technology sectors do not appear.  Also, because I study 
only the biotechnology industry, I further divide Sector 12 (Pharmaceutical and 
Biotechnology) into four subclasses5.  After these adjustments, patents are classified into 
16 technological sectors. 
5.3. A survivor measure for technology relatedness in the biotechnology industry: 
sample and methodology 
To collect a sample for the biotechnology industry, I have checked carefully 
several databases for biotech companies, including BioScan, ReCap, Bio member 
directory, and Mergent (Mergent Industry Review and Mergent Industry Code).  The 
collections of biotech firms are quite different in each database.  The main reason for 
inconsistency is that there has not yet been a unified definition of “biotechnology 
                                                 
5 Class 12 Biotechnology is divided into 4 subclasses: 424 and 514: Class 121; 435: Class 122; 436: Class 
123; 800: Class 124. 
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industry” and also because of the close relationship between the new biotechnology and 
the old pharmaceutical companies.  In the current U.S. statistical system, biotechnology is 
not an independent industry.  Since I lack the expertise and detailed information that are 
needed to decide if a company majors in biotech or not, I depend on a database that has 
put serious efforts in clearly and consistently defining the biotechnology industry, namely 
the data from NASDAQ and NYSE listed company profiles. 
The NASDAQ Biotechnology Index contains companies that are classified 
according to the FTSE™ Global Classification System as either biotechnology or 
pharmaceutical.  These companies must also meet other eligibility criteria.6  NYSE 
applies the Dow Jones Industry Classification System to identifying biotechnology 
companies.  I combine the listed firms in these two stock markets to construct the sample 
for the biotech industry.  Considering the close relationship between biotech and 
pharmaceutical companies, I also include pharmaceutical companies listed in NYSE. 
The sample includes all the companies that appeared in NASDAQ Biotechnology 
100 Index during 2000-2004 (which is available) and companies listed in the NYSE in 
2004.  The initial sample includes 230 public biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
companies (including foreign companies).  I exclude companies that have none patent 
and companies that only have patents in a single technology sector.  The sample used for 
relatedness matrix includes 186 companies.  According to Ernst & Young’s 2004 
biotechnology industry report, there are 1,473 biotechnology companies in the United 
States, of which 314 are publicly held.  It is reasonable to believe that the sample is well 
defined and representative for the U.S. biotech industry. 
                                                 
6 For details, see NASDAQ website: <http://dynamic.nasdaq.com/dynamic/nasdaqbiotech_activity.stm> 
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I collect patents for all the 186 companies during 1985-2004.  The patent portfolio 
of a firm includes all patents assigned to itself and to all its subsidiaries.  I use Mergent 
and SEC filings to identify companies’ subsidiary structure.  All patents have also been 
classified according to Cantwell’s scheme.  Some technology sectors do not appear.  
Also, we further divide Sector 12 into four subclasses.  After these adjustments, patents 
are classified into 56 technological sectors7. 
There are essentially two fundamental approaches to measure technological 
relatedness (Cantwell and Noonan 2004).  The first considers relatedness to be an ex ante 
phenomenon and points to the underlying scientific or engineering principles as 
indicating the degree of relatedness between technologies (Breschi et al. 2004).  The 
alternative approach is to view relatedness as an ex post phenomenon.  I adopt the second 
approach and the survivor principle in measuring the relatedness between technologies 
(Teece et al. 1994; Cantwell and Noonan 2004).  The relatedness between any two 
technology sectors andi j ( ) is : ijR
ij
ijij
ij
n
R σ
μ−=  
Where: actual number of linkages between technologies i and=ijn j ; 
            =ijμ the expected number of linkages between technologies i and j  under 
the hypergeometric distribution; and 
            =ijσ standard deviation of the number of linkages under the 
hypergeometric distribution. 
                                                 
7 Class 12 Biotechnology is divided into 4 subclasses: 424 and 514: Class 121; 435: Class 122; 436: Class 
123; 800 Class 124.  Among Cantwell’s 56 technology sectors, Class 24, 27, and 55 do not appear. 
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As suggested by Teece et al. (1994), if firms are assigned technologies randomly, 
ijR  should be insignificantly different from 0.  Of the 3,136 possible linkages between 
pairs of technology sectors, 2740 were observed.  An measure of relatedness was ijR
calculated for each of such pair.   is ranged from 13.6015 to -1.6212.  The average ijR
relatedness is 3.64 and the standard deviation is 2.62.  Thus, the randomness assumption 
is rejected, which has already been shown by Teece et al. (1994) and Breschi et al. 
(2004).  I further employ the relatedness matrix obtained here to measure technological 
relatedness between allying firms in the following discussion8. 
 
6. Model  
All hypotheses concern factors that play a role in influecing the likelihood of a 
particular alliance form chosen between two allying firms.  Therefore, I model the 
probability of an alliance form between two allying firms using a cumulative logit 
multinomial model.  I use a categorical variable (ORG) to indicate the organizational 
form of alliances.  ORG equals 0 when the alliance is R&D agreement, 1 when it is R&D 
collaboration, and 2 if organized as minority equity R&D alliance.  Thus, a higher value 
of ORG indicates a higher integration mode. 
6.1. Model specification: unobserved heterogeneity and network autocorrelation 
Before discussing the measurement of the variables included in the models, I note 
the inclusion of a number of control variables designed to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity.  Heckman and Borjas (1980) have demonstrated that unobserved 
heterogeneity across observations is likely to result in “occurrence” dependence.  In other 
                                                 
8 The relatedness matrix obtained here includes 56 technological sectors.  I use only those 16 technological 
sectors that appear in allying firms’ patent portfolios.  
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words, past realizations of a dependent variable are likely to be positively associated with 
the likelihood that a similar event will occur in the future.  To account for unobserved 
heterogeneity in the data, I following Stuart (1995)’s approach.  I include a variable 
(PALLI) that represents the total number of times that two allying firms have allied 
before.  The reason for including this variable is to try to build into the model the 
unobserved tendency for two firms to collaborate.  A number of factors – such as the 
presence of a high degree of trust among the two firms because of prior, successful 
collaboration—could affect the further organizational choice of alliances.  This proclivity 
is likely to be captured by the history of realized partnerships among the two firms in an 
alliance. 
Another type of statistical issue is the network autocorrelation.  As noted by 
Lincoln (1984), the problem with dyadic data is that observations are non-independent: 
within a time period, the same firm may be involved in multiple dyads, perhaps leading 
to a “common” actor effect.  Although there seems to be no widespread agreement on a 
computationally inexpensive method to handle network agreement, Lincoln (1984) 
suggests the inclusion of an additional variable as a “quick and dirty” means to treat 
autocorrelation in the data.  For each alliance, I construct the mean of the dependent 
variable computed across all other alliances in a year that involve either of the current 
two allying firms and normalized by the number of firms in the sample of that year. 
6.2. Independent variables 
(1) Knowledge similarity between allying firms (SIM) 
Revealed technological advantage (RTA) (Cantwell and Piscitello 2000) measures 
the concentration of the firm’s technological specialization in favored sectors.  The RTA 
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for each particular sector of technological activity is defined by the firm’s share in that 
sector of US patents applied9 by firms in the same industry, relative to the firm’s overall 
share of all US patents assigned to firms in the industry in question.  Specifically, 
denoting as the number of US patents applied in sector ijP j  by firm  in a particular 
industry, the RTA index is defined as follows: 
i
∑ ∑ ∑
∑=
j i j ijij
i ijij
ij PP
PP
RTA
/
/
 
Cantwell and Colombo (2000) point out that the reliability of RTA index may be 
harmed by “small numbers” in patents.  Some firms in my sample have a total of only a 
few patents or a few patents in some classes.  Regrouping patents by Cantwell’s 
classification scheme is one of the ways to solve this problem.  Only 16 sectors out of the 
56 are involved in this study of the biotechnology industry10.  Also, I use the adjusted 
RTA suggested by Cantwell and Vertova (2004) to avoid certain computation problem: 
1
1
1
1)( ++
−=+
ij
ij
ij RTA
RTA
RTAAdj  
I calculate Pearson’s correlation coefficient between RTA distributions of Firm 
 and Firm  across all the technological sectors.  Colombo (2003) suggests that the 
index  measures the technological overlapping between the two firms.  Thus, for an 
alliance between Firm  and Firm , technological similarity between them equals 
ikr
i k
ikr
i k
ikik rSIM =  
                                                 
9 Different form Cantwell and Piscitello (2000), I establish the firm’s patent portfolio according to the 
patent’s application date, instead of grant date.  For example, for a firm’s patent portfolio in year 2000, I 
include all granted patents that were applied before January 1, 2001.  
10 I include the technological sectors with more than 10 patents in any of three sample years. 
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(2) Interaction between technological diversity and technological similarity 
(SIMDIVC and SIMDIVD):  
I have argued that diversity of initial technologies influences a firm’s learning 
ability and managerial costs.  For a given level of technological similarity, a diversified 
firm may be more capable of learning dissimilar knowledge and at the same time may 
incur lower managerial costs.  To test its effect, I include an interaction term between 
technological diversity and technological similarity. 
I use the inverse of the coefficient of variation of the RTA index, across all 
the relevant sectors for the firm, to measure the firm’s technological diversity.  For Firm 
 in each period considered, the proxy for technological diversity will be the 
reciprocal of  that is: 
,iCV
i iDIV
,iCV
,1
i
i
RTA
RTA
i
i CV
DIV σ
μ==  
where 
iRTA
σ is the standard deviation and 
iRTA
μ is the mean value of the RTA distribution 
for Firm i (Cantwell and Piscitello 2000). 
As the motivation for the client firm and the R&D firm in an alliance may differ, I 
establish separate interaction terms for them: SIMDIVC is the interaction term for the 
client firm and SIMDIVD is the interaction term for the R&D firm. 
(3) Technological relatedness 
The allying firms are aiming at learning from partners.  Thus, the technological 
forte of the partner is what matters the most.  RTA index measures the relative 
technological strength of a firm in a particular technological sector.  A firm with a higher 
RTA in a sector is technologically superior in that sector.  Assume two allying firms,  i
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and j , are active in a total of  technological sectorsn 11.  Technological relatedness is 
then calculated as 
[ ]
n
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where Firm  is the firm (either Firm  or Firm m i j ) with a higher RTA in the technology 
sector .   represents the number of patents applied by Firm in technology 
sector .   is the relatedness between technology sector  and b  
obtained from the related matrix calculated by the 2004 biotechnology sample. 
b amPatent , m
a ),( basrelatednes a
6.3. Control variables 
To compare with Sampson (2004) and Colombo (2003)’s discussions on the 
knowledge-based and transaction-cost perspectives, I also include the following control 
variables: 
Breadth of Alliance Activities (BREADTH): “Breadth of Alliance Activities” is 
set to one when an alliance includes activities beyond just collaborative research and 
development.  Sampson (2004) shows that wider alliance activities lead to a higher level 
of integration in the alliance form. 
Prior and Concurrent Alliances (PALLI): This measure is calculated by the 
number of prior and concurrent ties between allying firms in the focal alliance (Sampson 
2004).  She suggests that the more prior and concurrent alliances there are between the 
allying firms, the less is the probability of opportunistic behavior; thus, the less 
                                                 
11 To be considered as being active in a technological sector, the firm needs to have at least 6 patents in that 
sector. 
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integration is needed.  The variable is also included as a control for occurrence 
dependence problem. 
General Firm Reputation (REPU): A firm’s reputation effect is the lowest 
number of prior alliances for all allying firms in the focal alliance.  As in the case of the 
PALLI variable, transaction-cost economics predicts that with a higher reputation, less 
integration is needed. 
I include the following control variables in the model, which are suggested by 
previous literatures. 
The AGE is the years of establishment of the younger firm in the focal alliance.  
R&D Intensity of the alliance (SIZE) is the R&D expenditures to employee ratio.  I use 
this index to measure the relative size of alliances.  Difference in R&D intensity 
(RD_GAP) and difference in technological diversity (DIV_GAP) between allying 
firms have sometimes been used as proxies for the extent of divergence of firms’ 
capabilities.  I include these two variables to control for any difference in capabilities that 
has not been captured by technological similarity (SIM), technological relatedness (REL), 
and technological diversity.  To control for time-specific patterns, I have dummies for 
years 1999 and 2000 (Y99 and Y00) in the model. 
I also include an interaction term between age and technological relatedness 
(RELAGE). Teece et al. (1994) and Breschi et al. (2004) both suggest that firms develop 
in a coherent way.  Firms are constrained in the directions of their technological search, 
which is strongly influenced by firms’ core technologies and products.  I suggest that the 
firm gives critically related technologies a priority in the process of knowledge 
acquisition.  After years of establishment, the firm would have already obtained the most 
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closely related technologies and formed a relatively stable path of technological 
expansion.  Therefore, technological relatedness may have different influences on 
younger firms and older firms. 
 
7. Results: comparison among three models 
Table 2 and Table 3 show the descriptive statistics and the Pearson correlation 
matrix of independent and control variables.  Results of the econometric estimates of the 
multinomial logit models are illustrated in Table 4.  The table shows the estimates of the 
coefficients of the independents variables, their standard errors, and the individual and 
joint significant levels. 
[Table 2 here] 
[Table 3 here] 
[Table 4 here] 
The main objective of this study is to highlight the role played by the firm-
specific technological characteristics in the choice of R&D alliance forms.  I run three 
models to compare the transaction-cost perspective, the “traditional” knowledge-based 
theory, and the “complete” knowledge-based theory.  The findings of the regressions 
clearly support the arguments inspired by the knowledge-based theory of the firm. 
Model 1 is the model tested by Sampson (2004).  I do not include Narrow or 
Broad Alliance Activity because of information availability.  Also, I omit the Multilateral 
Alliance because all the alliances are bilateral.  In Sampson’s model, which is in favor of 
transaction costs economics, both SIM and the squared term of SIM were significant, 
which implies a quadratic relationship between organizational choice and knowledge 
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similarity (technological diversity in her model).  However, in Model 1 here both terms 
are insignificant.  Also, BREADTH is significant and negative, which means the more 
different types of activities the alliances involves, the more likely the allying firms 
choose less integrated organizational mode, which is opposite to the positive and 
significant estimate from Sampson’s model. 
The difference between Model 2 and Model 3 is that Model 2 only considers 
technological similarity, as most studies on the organizational form in the knowledge-
based theory did.  In Model 2, the coefficient of technological similarity (SIM) is 
negative and significant, implying a less integrated mode is preferred for alliances 
between firms with highly similar technologies.  The result is consistent with Hypothesis 
1b about learning technology.  BREADTH is still negative and significant.  SIZE is 
positive and significant.  Recall that SIZE is calculated as R&D intensity of the alliance.  
Thus the higher the intensity of the R&D activity, the more likely the allying firms 
choose the higher integrated organizational mode.  An intensive R&D investment shows 
the critical importance learning and innovation.  With this key business strategy, a firm 
values gaining knowledge and is willing to bear higher costs in managing dissimilar 
knowledge. 
In Model 3, I include technological similarity, relatedness, and diversity measures 
and the interactions terms.  All technology-related variables are significant, except the 
interaction between similarity and R&D firms’ diversity. 
An initial inspection of the results in Table 4 shows general support for the 
hypothesis about technology similarity derived from the learning-knowledge line of 
thought – increasing technological dissimilarity between allying firms increases the 
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probability that allying firms choose a more integrated mode.  As firms become less 
overlapped in their technological expertise with their partners, they are more likely to 
choose a more integrated mode, such as a minority equity R&D alliance instead of a 
simple R&D agreement.  The more dissimilar a firm is from its partner in terms of 
technological specialization, the greater the need and the gains from enhanced knowledge 
substitution and flexibility over the course of the alliance.  In this sense, firms appear to 
choose alliance form mainly in response to considerations over learning technology. 
At a higher level of technological similarity, however, the results suggest a 
slightly different story – the relationship between technological similarity and 
organizational choice reverse in sign.  The coefficient on squared technological similarity 
is positive and significant.  Initially, rising similarity decreases the probability of 
choosing a higher integration mode.  However, beyond a certain level of technological 
similarity, this relationship turns positive.  Technological similarity beyond this minimum 
point actually increases the probability that a more integrated mode is chosen. 
To better illustrate the relationship between technological similarity and 
organization choice, I calculated the expected probability that partners select a minority 
equity R&D alliance and the expected probability that partners select a collaborative 
R&D agreement at all levels of technological similarity.  Follow Sampson (2004)’s 
method, I take the estimates form Table 4 and evaluate these estimates at the median 
values of the independent and the control variables.  I then calculate the expected 
probability over all values of technological similarity in the sample, ranging from 
 to .  These calculations are graphed in Figure 1 and Figure 2. 50657.0− 73335.0
[Figure 1 here] 
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[Figure 2 here] 
The figures show that technological similarity definitively bears a non-monotonic 
relationship with alliances’ organizational choice.  Allying firms more likely select a 
more integrated mode as their technological specialization diverges.  Beyond a relatively 
high level of similarity, though, firms are more likely to choose a high integration mode 
as technological similarity increases.  The fact that this effect inverses as partners’ 
technologies become more overlapped lends empirical support to the line of thought 
emphasizing managerial costs as two firms with similar technologies cooperate 
(Hypothesis 1a).  Firms tend to bring in-house similar technologies which incur lower 
managerial costs to realize economies of scale in managerial ability.  It follows that 
taking advantage of economies of scale and lower managerial costs is the main concern in 
R&D alliances between firms with a certain high level of technological similarity. 
The coefficient of technology relatedness is positive and significant, which 
supports Hypothesis 2.  Superior in closely related technologies leads to a more 
integrated mode in R&D alliances.  Keeping closely complementary technologies within 
a closer access realizes the economies of scope of the fixed level of managerial resources 
and avoids the high dynamic transaction costs caused by leaving complementary 
technology assets in the market.  The interaction term between the years of establishment 
of younger firms and technological relatedness is negative and significant, though.  This 
shows that firms’ technological capabilities grow in a dynamic and path-dependent way.  
Newly established firm needs to acquire and assimilate closely related technologies.  
They are more likely to acquire related technologies by integration in R&D alliances.  
However, the firm’s core competence, which decides both its technology profile and 
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growth direction, would become stable after years of development.  Thus, older and more 
established firms would have already established its unique technological portfolio, 
which contains complementary technologies critical to its survival and growth.  Thus, 
technological relatedness has a weaker influence on organizational choice in the alliances 
between older firms. 
Technological diversity of client firms has a positive and significant interaction 
with similarity.  For a given level of similarity, a technologically diversified client firm 
increases the probability that an alliance is formed as a highly integrated mode.  The 
finding supports that the firm is stable in its technological strategies – a technological 
generalist tends to go on as a generalist.  The effect of R&D firms’ technological 
diversity is not significant.  It may be because that client firms take a more active role in 
learning and managing new technologies in R&D alliances than R&D firms. 
In Model 3, BREATH is still negative and significant.  The positive and 
significant effects of AGE and SIZE suggest that older and R&D intensive firms tend to 
employ more integrated modes in R&D alliances. 
 
8. Discussion and conclusions 
Previous studies have already provided evidence related to the relation between 
firm’s technological capabilities and alliance form.  Relying mainly on arguments in 
transaction-cost approach, Nakamura et al. (1996) contend that joint ventures are 
generally aimed at combining dissimilar yet complementary specialized intangible assets 
possessed by different firms.  Colombo (2003)’s study supports the knowledge-based 
theory that in technological alliances divergence in partners’ technological specialization 
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results in a higher propensity to use equity form.  Stuart (1995) highlights that the firm’ 
technological characteristics, including overlapping technological niches and 
technological diversity, affect the likelihood of two firms to form an alliance. 
The main objective of this paper is to provide a thorough analysis and empirical 
test of arguments suggested by the knowledge-based theory of the firm as regards the 
organizational choice of R&D alliances.  The findings in the study are consistent with 
previous researches.  And it supports the knowledge-based theory in a more direct way 
by a thorough analysis of how firms’ tacit and idiosyncratic technological capabilities 
influence the choice of alliance form. 
Previous studies believed that it is difficult to test whether an independent 
knowledge-based theory of the firm is needed besides transaction costs economics in 
explaining the organizational choice problem since the predictions of such theories often 
coincide (Sampson 2004; Conner and Phrahalad 1996).  However, two problems in 
current studies may mistakenly lead to the coincidence. 
First, to discuss the influence of knowledge similarity on the organizational 
choice, transaction costs economics assumes a specific relationship between knowledge 
similarity and the probability of opportunistic behaviors.  Transaction cost economics has 
been highlighting the need to cope with opportunistic behavior and emphasizing using the 
highly integrated organizational mode to control opportunistic behaviors and reduce 
opportunism-related transaction costs.  As suggested by Colombo (2003), transaction cost 
economics has no clear predictions as to the influence exerted by knowledge similarity on 
the choice of the governance mode of alliances.  The divergence of partners’ 
technological capabilities may lead to either a decrease or an increase in transaction costs, 
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depending on whether appropriability hazards caused by unintended knowledge 
spillovers to partners or contractual hazards associated with the “hold-up” problem 
prevail.  It is hard to draw a conclusion generally.  The knowledge-based theory, 
incorporating both learning and managing technology, suggests that if allying firms have 
dissimilar technology capabilities, they tend to choose a higher integration mode to 
facilitate knowledge flow.  When two allying firms have highly similar technologies 
capabilities, the main concern of the alliances would be to take advantage of the 
economies of scale in managing technology, and thus the higher integration mode would 
be chosen within an alliance between two firms with highly similar technological 
portfolios.  This result is consistent with Sampson (2004) result in the study of 
telecommunication industry, although she explained the trend through transaction costs 
perspective.  Generally, learning technology is the dominating process in R&D alliances.  
The negative and significant effects of knowledge similarity is observed in both Colombo 
(2003) and the study here (Model 2). 
The other problem is the lack of differentiation between technological similarity 
and technological relatedness.  There is a tendency to mean “related technology” by 
saying “similar technology.”  However, “similar” technologies are not necessarily 
“related.”  Richardson (1972, pp. 888-890) defines “similar activities” as “activities 
which require the same capability for their undertaking,” while he explains 
complementary activities or related activities as “ activities … present different phases of 
a process of production and require in some way or another to be coordinated” and he 
points out complementary activities need not to be similar.  The tire industry is closely 
complementary (related) to the car industry.  However, technologies in these two 
 - 34 -
industries are not necessary similar to each other12.  Previous researches have been 
studying the relationship between technology capabilities and organizational choice 
without unambiguously distinguishing between similar capabilities and related 
capabilities.  The findings show that these two technological characteristics have distinct 
contributions to explaining the organizational choice.  Technological relatedness 
significantly increases the possibility of allying firms to use a higher integration mode in 
R&D activities. 
Besides technological similarity and relatedness, technology diversity also has a 
significant impact on the choice of the governance form.  The findings show that the firm 
is consistent in its technological development strategy.  At the same level of 
technological similarity, a technology generalist tends to integrate more technologies 
within its boundary. 
                                                 
12 Thanks for Richard N. Langlois for clarifying these two concepts.  
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Table 1 
R&D Alliances in the U.S. Biotechnology Industry during 1998-2000 
Year R&D Alliances Firms Patents 
 
R&D 
Agreements 
R&D 
Collaborations
Minority Equity 
R&D Alliances Total 
1998 7 16 1 24 34 3506
1999 14 20 3 37 46 4537
2000 21 23 6 50 72 5483
Total 40 59 10 111 115
 
Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics  
Variable N Mean Std Dev Sum Minimum Maximum
Alliance Form (ORG) 
 
111 0.71171 0.62359 79 0 2 
Technological Similarity (SIM) 
 
111 0.27043 0.27699 30.01787 -0.50657 0.73335 
Square of Technological Similarity (SIM * SIM) 
 
111 0.14916 0.15317 16.55713 0.0000276 0.5378 
Technological Relatedness (REL) 
 
111 2.07157 0.75692 229.94433 -0.16714 4.29575 
Interaction: REL*AGE (RELAGE) 
 
111 14.76916 10.12672 1639 -1.83853 50.64456 
Interaction: SIM*DIVCa (SIMDIVC) 
 
111 0.15071 0.20706 16.72923 -0.83341 0.66756 
Interaction: SIM*DIVDb (SIMDIVD) 
 
111 0.14294 0.15613 15.86678 -0.33586 0.5636 
Breadth of Alliance Activities (BREADTH) 
 
111 0.09009 0.28761 10 0 1 
Prior and Concurrent Alliances (PALLI) 
 
111 0.16216 0.41649 18 0 2 
General Firm Reputation (REPU) 
 
111 16.34234 12.42541 1814 0 66 
The Age of the allying firm (AGE) 
 
111 7.22523 3.96045 802 0 21 
R&D Intensity of alliance (SIZE) 
 
111 0.13351 0.08393 14.81991 0.00255 0.62573 
difference in R&D intensity (RD_GAP) 
 
111 0.10976 0.09534 12.18351 0.0007359 0.56975 
difference in knowledge diversification (DIV_GAP) 
 
111 0.25282 0.24074 28.0625 0.0003812 1.20061 
network autocorrelation adjustment (CORRECT) 
 
111 0.02673 0.0301 2.96743 0 0.13043 
       
 
                                                 
a DIVC is technological diversity of the client firm. 
b DIVD is technological diversity of the R&D firm. 
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Table 3  
Pearson Correlation Matrix  
 ORG SIM SIM*SIM REL RELAGE SIMDIVC SIMDIVD BREADTH 
ORG 1        
Alliance Form         
SIM -0.02299 1       
Technological Similarity (0.8107)        
SIM*SIM 0.05446 0.77071 1      
Square of Technological Similarity (0.5702) (<.0001)       
REL -0.03395 -0.01208 -0.06224 1     
Technological Relatedness (0.7235) (0.8998) (0.5164)      
RELAGE -0.10401 0.00032 -0.00748 0.47907 1    
Interaction: REL*AGE (0.2773) (0.9973) (0.9379) (<.0001)     
SIMDIVC 0.01902 0.885 0.57081 0.00997 0.02631 1   
Interaction: SIM*DIVC (0.8429) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.9173) (0.784)    
SIMDIVD -0.01421 0.89232 0.63552 0.10708 0.09619 0.79947 1  
Interaction: SIM*DIVD (0.8824) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2633) (0.3153) (<.0001)   
BREADTH -0.20869 -0.04313 -0.02503 0.12148 0.10951 -0.04312 -0.0668 1 
Breadth of Alliance Activities (0.0279) (0.6531) (0.7943) (0.204) (0.2526) (0.6532) (0.4861)  
PALLI -0.06338 0.17781 0.1787 -0.03475 -0.1454 0.21007 0.20135 0.02872 
Prior and Concurrent Alliances (0.5087) (0.0619) (0.0606) (0.7173) (0.1278) (0.0269) (0.0341) (0.7648) 
REPU -0.1033 -0.04238 -0.072 0.07766 0.21529 -0.02081 0.06104 -0.11046 
General Firm Reputation (0.2806) (0.6588) (0.4527) (0.4179) (0.0233) (0.8283) (0.5245) (0.2484) 
AGE -0.04709 0.02795 0.04301 -0.06678 0.80118 0.03574 0.06746 0.06184 
The Age of the Allying Firm (0.6236) (0.7709) (0.654) (0.4862) (<.0001) (0.7096) (0.4818) (0.5191) 
SIZE 0.27292 0.17137 0.05481 -0.08314 -0.09405 0.12473 0.14409 -0.20297 
R&D Intensity of the Alliance (0.0038) (0.0721) (0.5678) (0.3856) (0.3262) (0.1921) (0.1314) (0.0326) 
RD_GAP 0.03069 0.02934 -0.06597 0.20042 -0.00983 -0.01161 0.01317 0.25065 
Difference in R&D Intensity (0.7491) (0.7599) (0.4915) (0.0349) (0.9184) (0.9037) (0.8909) (0.008) 
DIV_GAP -0.01634 -0.2504 -0.05949 0.14652 0.06374 -0.17889 -0.20027 -0.02188 
Difference in Technological Diversity (0.8648) (0.008) (0.5351) (0.1249) (0.5063) (0.0603) (0.0351) (0.8197) 
CORRECT -0.07215 -0.01364 -0.07644 0.12102 -0.23289 0.0792 0.02018 -0.02708 
Network Autocorrelation Adjustment (0.4518) (0.887) (0.4252) (0.2058) (0.0139) (0.4086) (0.8335) (0.7778) 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Pearson Correlation Matrix  
 PALLI REPU AGE SIZE RD_GAP DIV_GAP CORRECT 
ORG   
Alliance Form   
SIM   
Technological Similarity   
SIM*SIM   
Square of Technological Similarity   
REL   
Technological Relatedness   
RELAGE   
Interaction: REL*AGE   
SIMDIVC   
Interaction: SIM*DIVC   
SIMDIVD   
Interaction: SIM*DIVD   
BREADTH        
Breadth of Alliance Activities        
PALLI 1       
Prior and Concurrent Alliances        
REPU 0.09809 1      
General Firm Reputation (0.3057)       
AGE -0.13257 0.17928 1     
The Age of the Allying Firm (0.1654) (0.0597)      
SIZE -0.02029 0.04999 -0.08861 1    
R&D Intensity of the Alliance (0.8326) (0.6023) (0.355)     
RD_GAP 0.06008 -0.00688 -0.11889 0.35014 1   
Difference in R&D Intensity (0.5311) (0.9428) (0.2139) (0.0002)    
DIV_GAP 0.16114 0.0234 -0.01215 -0.20719 -0.0516 1  
Difference in Technological Diversity (0.0911) (0.8074) (0.8993) (0.0291) (0.5907)   
CORRECT 0.21134 0.16902 -0.37582 0.04941 0.24767 0.12278 1 
Network Autocorrelation Adjustment (0.026) (0.0762) (<.0001) (0.6066) (0.0088) (0.1992)  
Table 4 
Determinants of Organizational Choice: 
Estimation of Cumulative Logit Multinomial Model 
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept1 (ORG=2) 
-1.7567***
(0.5888)
-2.5895***
(0.7292)
-5.7139***
(1.6936)
Intercept2 (ORG=1) 1.1872**
(0.5507)
0.5627
(0.6521)
-2.2760
(1.5975)
SIM -1.2727
(1.1078)
--2.1246*
(1.2330)
-8.8635***
(3.3317)
SIM*SIM 2.3426
(2.0513)
3.5354
(2.1953)
6.9359***
(2.5801)
REL 1.4842**
(0.6491)
RELAGE -0.1881**
(0.0797)
SIMDIVC 5.6977**
(2.5391)
SIMDIVD 2.3713
(3.1623)
BREADTH -1.7040**
(0.7501)
-1.4298*
(0.8296)
-1.6210**
(0.9308)
PALLI -0.1424
(0.4748)
-0.0646
(0.4874)
-0.2736
(0.5191)
REPU -0.0196
(0.0158)
-0.0213
(0.0163)
-0.0189
(0.2886)
AGE 0.3703**
(0.1815)
SIZE 7.0431**
(2.8745)
8.7791***
(3.1367)
RD_GAP 0.6574
(2.5385)
0.7682
(2.7216)
DIV_GAP -0.1922
(0.8990)
-0.7108
(0.9562)
CORRECT -3.5646
(6.8087)
-6.1385
(7.3867)
-10.3184
(8.1665)
Y99 0.0154
(0.5188)
-0.0212
(0.5508)
0.0539
(0.5743)
Y00 -0.1748
(0.7362)
-0.5350
(0.5504)
-0.4649
(0.6045)
N 111 111 111
LOG(L) -97.6257 -93.1116 -87.0614
LR test 9.099 18.1272* 30.2276**
D.O.F. 8 11 16
*** chisq < 0.01 
**   chisq < 0.05 
*     chisq < 0.1 
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Figure 1 
The Effect of Technological Similarity on Organizational Choice 
(Between ORG=2 and ORG=0) 
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Figure 2 
The Effect of Technological Similarity on Organizational Choice 
(Between ORG=1 and ORG=0) 
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